QUIC Working GroupM. Thomson, Editor
Internet-DraftMozilla
Intended status: Standards TrackS. Turner, Editor
Expires: September 14, 2017sn3rd
March 13, 2017

free dating personals london Using Transport Layer Security (TLS) to Secure QUIC

draft-ietf-quic-tls-02

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free online dating oklahoma city QUIC [QUIC-TRANSPORT] provides a multiplexed transport. When used for HTTP [RFC7230] semantics [QUIC-HTTP] it provides several key advantages over HTTP/1.1 [RFC7230] or HTTP/2 [RFC7540] over TCP [RFC0793].hong kong cupid dating site

local black singles chat lines This document describes how QUIC can be secured using Transport Layer Security (TLS) version 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. TLS 1.3 provides critical latency improvements for connection establishment over previous versions. Absent packet loss, most new connections can be established and secured within a single round trip; on subsequent connections between the same client and server, the client can often send application data immediately, that is, using a zero round trip setup.gay chat new york city

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free singles chat london QUIC [QUIC-TRANSPORT] assumes responsibility for the confidentiality and integrity protection of packets. For this it uses keys derived from a TLS 1.3 connection [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]; QUIC also relies on TLS 1.3 for authentication and negotiation of parameters that are critical to security and performance.speed dating in bangalore

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+------------+                        +------------+
|            |------ Handshake ------>|            |
|            |<-- Validate Address ---|            |
|            |-- OK/Error/Validate -->|            |
|            |<----- Handshake -------|            |
|   QUIC     |------ Validate ------->|    TLS     |
|            |                        |            |
|            |<------ 0-RTT OK -------|            |
|            |<------ 1-RTT OK -------|            |
|            |<--- Handshake Done ----|            |
+------------+                        +------------+
 |         ^                               ^ |
 | Protect | Protected                     | |
 v         | Packet                        | |
+------------+                             / /
|   QUIC     |                            / /
|  Packet    |-------- Get Secret -------' /
| Protection |<-------- Secret -----------'
+------------+

online dating app nz Figure 1: QUIC and TLS Interactions

online dating queenstown nz The initial state of a QUIC connection has packets exchanged without any form of protection. In this state, QUIC is limited to using stream 1 and associated packets. Stream 1 is reserved for a TLS connection. This is a complete TLS connection as it would appear when layered over TCP; the only difference is that QUIC provides the reliability and ordering that would otherwise be provided by TCP.free dating in kampala

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  • A full, 1-RTT handshake in which the client is able to send application data after one round trip and the server immediately after receiving the first handshake message from the client.
  • A 0-RTT handshake in which the client uses information it has previously learned about the server to send immediately. This data can be replayed by an attacker so it MUST NOT carry a self-contained trigger for any non-idempotent action.

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    Client                                             Server

    ClientHello
   (0-RTT Application Data)  -------->
                                                  ServerHello
                                         {EncryptedExtensions}
                                                    {Finished}
                             <--------      [Application Data]
   (EndOfEarlyData)
   {Finished}                -------->

   [Application Data]        <------->      [Application Data]

best dating groups on facebook Figure 2: TLS Handshake with 0-RTT

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  • The server can respond to a ClientHello with a HelloRetryRequest, which adds an additional round trip prior to the basic exchange. This is needed if the server wishes to request a different key exchange key from the client. HelloRetryRequest is also used to verify that the client is correctly able to receive packets on the address it claims to have (see [QUIC-TRANSPORT]).
  • A pre-shared key mode can be used for subsequent handshakes to avoid public key operations. This is the basis for 0-RTT data, even if the remainder of the connection is protected by a new Diffie-Hellman exchange.

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    Client                                             Server

@C QUIC STREAM Frame(s) <1>:
     ClientHello
       + QUIC Extension
                            -------->
                        0-RTT Key => @0

@0 QUIC STREAM Frame(s) <any stream>:
   Replayable QUIC Frames
                            -------->

                                      QUIC STREAM Frame <1>: @C
                                               ServerHello
                                  {TLS Handshake Messages}
                            <--------
                        1-RTT Key => @1

                                           QUIC Frames <any> @1
                            <--------
@C QUIC STREAM Frame(s) <1>:
     (EndOfEarlyData)
     {Finished}
                            -------->

@1 QUIC Frames <any>        <------->      QUIC Frames <any> @1

gay singles in kampala Figure 3: QUIC over TLS Handshake

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  • ”<” and “>” enclose stream numbers.
  • ”@” indicates the key phase that is currently used for protecting QUIC packets.
  • ”(“ and “)” enclose messages that are protected with TLS 0-RTT handshake or application keys.
  • ”{“ and “}” enclose messages that are protected by the TLS Handshake keys.

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Important:
Until the handshake is reported as complete, the connection and key exchange are not properly authenticated at the server. Even though 1-RTT keys are available to a server after receiving the first handshake messages from a client, the server cannot consider the client to be authenticated until it receives and validates the client’s Finished message.
The requirement for the server to wait for the client Finished message creates a dependency on that message being delivered. A client can avoid the potential for head-of-line blocking that this implies by sending a copy of the STREAM frame that carries the Finished message in multiple packets. This enables immediate server processing for those packets.

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Client                                                    Server

Get Handshake
0-RTT Key Ready
                      --- send/receive --->
                                              Handshake Received
                                                 0-RTT Key Ready
                                                   Get Handshake
                                                1-RTT Keys Ready
                     <--- send/receive ---
Handshake Received
Get Handshake
Handshake Complete
1-RTT Keys Ready
                      --- send/receive --->
                                              Handshake Received
                                                   Get Handshake
                                              Handshake Complete
                     <--- send/receive ---
Handshake Received
Get Handshake

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speed dating calgary world record Errors in the TLS connection SHOULD be signaled using TLS alerts on stream 1. A failure in the handshake MUST be treated as a QUIC connection error of type TLS_HANDSHAKE_FAILED. Once the handshake is complete, an error in the TLS connection that causes a TLS alert to be sent or received MUST be treated as a QUIC connection error of type TLS_FATAL_ALERT_GENERATED or TLS_FATAL_ALERT_RECEIVED respectively.meet singles in las vegas for free


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   client_0rtt_secret
       = TLS-Exporter("EXPORTER-QUIC 0-RTT Secret"
                      "", Hash.length)

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   client_pp_secret_0
       = TLS-Exporter("EXPORTER-QUIC client 1-RTT Secret"
                      "", Hash.length)
   server_pp_secret_0
       = TLS-Exporter("EXPORTER-QUIC server 1-RTT Secret"
                      "", Hash.length)

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   client_pp_secret_<N+1>
       = HKDF-Expand-Label(client_pp_secret_<N>,
                           "QUIC client 1-RTT Secret",
                           "", Hash.length)
   server_pp_secret_<N+1>
       = HKDF-Expand-Label(server_pp_secret_<N>,
                           "QUIC server 1-RTT Secret",
                           "", Hash.length)

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   info = (HashLen / 256) || (HashLen % 256) || 0x21 ||
          "TLS 1.3, QUIC client 1-RTT secret" || 0x00

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   client_0rtt_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(client_0rtt_secret,
                                       "key", "", key_length)
   client_0rtt_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label(client_0rtt_secret,
                                      "iv", "", iv_length)

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   client_pp_key_<N> = HKDF-Expand-Label(client_pp_secret_<N>,
                                         "key", "", key_length)
   client_pp_iv_<N> = HKDF-Expand-Label(client_pp_secret_<N>,
                                        "iv", "", iv_length)
   server_pp_key_<N> = HKDF-Expand-Label(server_pp_secret_<N>,
                                         "key", "", key_length)
   server_pp_iv_<N> = HKDF-Expand-Label(server_pp_secret_<N>,
                                        "iv", "", iv_length)

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singles club las vegas The Authentication Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) [RFC5116] function used for QUIC packet protection is AEAD that is negotiated for use with the TLS connection. For example, if TLS is using the TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, the AEAD_AES_128_GCM function is used.gay singles in johannesburg

tyler perry's the single moms' club las vegas nv Regular QUIC packets are protected by an AEAD [RFC5116]. Version negotiation and public reset packets are not protected.best speed dating companies in nyc

single mother housing las vegas nv Once TLS has provided a key, the contents of regular QUIC packets immediately after any TLS messages have been sent are protected by the AEAD selected by TLS.free video english chat

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bars for singles las vegas QUIC has a single, contiguous packet number space. In comparison, TLS restarts its sequence number each time that record protection keys are changed. The sequence number restart in TLS ensures that a compromise of the current traffic keys does not allow an attacker to truncate the data that is sent after a key update by sending additional packets under the old key (causing new packets to be discarded).free dating in oklahoma city

lds singles conference las vegas nevada QUIC does not assume a reliable transport and is required to handle attacks where packets are dropped in other ways. QUIC is therefore not affected by this form of truncation.chat gay los angeles california

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   Initiating Peer                    Responding Peer

@M QUIC Frames
               New Keys -> @N
@N QUIC Frames
                      -------->
                                          QUIC Frames @M
                          New Keys -> @N
                                          QUIC Frames @N
                      <--------

dating sim games for ipad Figure 5: Key Update

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ISSUE:
What about 0-RTT data? Should we allow acknowledgment of 0-RTT with unprotected frames? If we don’t, then 0-RTT data will be unacknowledged until the handshake completes. This isn’t a problem if the handshake completes without loss, but it could mean that 0-RTT stalls when a handshake packet disappears for any reason.

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ISSUE:
This would not be an issue if QUIC had a randomized starting sequence number. If we choose to randomize, we fix this problem and reduce the denial of service exposure to on-path attackers. The only possible problem is in authenticating the initial value, so that peers can be sure that they haven’t missed an initial message.

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   enum {
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   } ExtensionType;

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single family homes for sale in north las vegas All the restrictions on the use of 0-RTT apply, with the exception of the ALPN label, which MUST only change to a label that is explicitly designated as being compatible. The client indicates which ALPN label it has chosen by placing that ALPN label first in the ALPN extension.free dating in uganda

single family homes for sale in lake las vegas The certificate that the server uses MUST be considered valid for both connections, which will use different protocol stacks and could use different port numbers. For instance, HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 operate over TLS and TCP, whereas QUIC operates over UDP.dating websites perth wa

new single family homes for sale in las vegas Source address validation is not completely portable between different protocol stacks. Even if the source IP address remains constant, the port number is likely to be different. Packet reflection attacks are still possible in this situation, though the set of hosts that can initiate these attacks is greatly reduced. A server might choose to avoid source address validation for such a connection, or allow an increase to the amount of data that it sends toward the client without source validation.oasis dating site perth wa


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single family house for sale in las vegas There are likely to be some real clangers here eventually, but the current set of issues is well captured in the relevant sections of the main text.catholic singles los angeles events

best online dating rpg games Never assume that because it isn’t in the security considerations section it doesn’t affect security. Most of this document does.speed dating in staten island new york

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best online dating games A small ClientHello that results in a large block of handshake messages from a server can be used in packet reflection attacks to amplify the traffic generated by an attacker.single moms las vegas nv

best online dating sites san francisco Certificate caching [RFC7924] can reduce the size of the server’s handshake messages significantly.single mother programs in las vegas

best dating website san diego QUIC requires that the packet containing a ClientHello be padded to the size of the maximum transmission unit (MTU). A server is less likely to generate a packet reflection attack if the data it sends is a small multiple of this size. A server SHOULD use a HelloRetryRequest if the size of the handshake messages it sends is likely to significantly exceed the size of the packet containing the ClientHello.scholarships for single mothers in las vegas nv

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top dating apps on facebook QUIC, TLS and HTTP/2 all contain a messages that have legitimate uses in some contexts, but that can be abused to cause a peer to expend processing resources without having any observable impact on the state of the connection. If processing is disproportionately large in comparison to the observable effects on bandwidth or state, then this could allow a malicious peer to exhaust processing capacity without consequence.most popular dating app in hong kong

dating apps new york city QUIC prohibits the sending of empty singles events los angeles area STREAM frames unless they are marked with the FIN bit. This prevents christian singles events los angeles STREAM frames from being sent that only waste effort.where to meet singles in new york city

assistance for single mothers in las vegas TLS records SHOULD always contain at least one octet of a handshake messages or alert. Records containing only padding are permitted during the handshake, but an excessive number might be used to generate unnecessary work. Once the TLS handshake is complete, endpoints SHOULD NOT send TLS application data records unless it is to hide the length of QUIC records. QUIC packet protection does not include any allowance for padding; padded TLS application data records can be used to mask the length of QUIC frames.best free china dating sites

housing for single moms in las vegas While there are legitimate uses for some redundant packets, implementations SHOULD track redundant packets and treat excessive volumes of any non-productive packets as indicative of an attack.china free dating websites


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zimbabwean singles in south africa The portion of the QUIC error code space allocated for the crypto handshake is 0xC0000000-0xFFFFFFFF. The following error codes are defined when TLS is used for the crypto handshake:china 100 free dating site

TLS_HANDSHAKE_FAILED (0xC000001C):
The TLS handshake failed.
TLS_FATAL_ALERT_GENERATED (0xC000001D):
A TLS fatal alert was sent, causing the TLS connection to end prematurely.
TLS_FATAL_ALERT_RECEIVED (0xC000001E):
A TLS fatal alert was received, causing the TLS connection to end prematurely.

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single ladies in las vegas nm References

beyonce single ladies live in las vegas Normative References

[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
Rescorla, E., “single ladies live in las vegas”, Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19 (work in progress), March 2017.
[QUIC-TRANSPORT]
Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., “QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport”.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., “single girl in las vegas”, BCP 14, RFC 2119, single females in las vegas, March 1997, <single parents las vegas>.
[RFC5116]
McGrew, D., “top latin dating websites”, RFC 5116, dating agency new york, January 2008, <best hotel for single guys in las vegas>.
[RFC5869]
Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, “single guys on craigslist las vegas”, RFC 5869, things for single guys to do in las vegas, May 2010, <single man vacation las vegas>.
[RFC7230]
Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., “single black males in las vegas”, RFC 7230, single male in las vegas, June 2014, <being a single man in las vegas>.
[RFC7301]
Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan, “things for a single man to do in las vegas”, RFC 7301, single man's guide to las vegas, July 2014, <dating sim games iphone>.

dating simulation games iphone Informative References

[AEBounds]
Luykx, A. and K. Paterson, “asian professionals speed dating melbourne”, March 2016, <single guy going to las vegas>.
[QUIC-HTTP]
Bishop, M., Ed., “Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) over QUIC”.
[QUIC-RECOVERY]
Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., “QUIC Loss Detection and Congestion Control”.
[RFC0793]
Postel, J., “what can a single guy do in las vegas”, STD 7, RFC 793, single guy living in las vegas, September 1981, <single guy's guide to las vegas>.
[RFC2818]
Rescorla, E., “single mom assistance las vegas”, RFC 2818, single mother assistance las vegas, May 2000, <single mom support las vegas>.
[RFC5280]
Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, “dating sites harare zimbabwe”, RFC 5280, free dating site for gamers, May 2008, <100 free dating sites for gamers>.
[RFC7540]
Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., “russian dating new york city”, RFC 7540, best dating site saskatchewan, May 2015, <best dating site saskatoon>.
[RFC7924]
Santesson, S. and H. Tschofenig, “best dating site san diego”, RFC 7924, best dating sites san francisco, July 2016, <best dating site san francisco>.

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best dating sites sacramento Ryan Hamilton was originally an author of this specification.best dating site sacramento


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best dating apps on fb This document has benefited from input from Dragana Damjanovic, Christian Huitema, Jana Iyengar, Adam Langley, Roberto Peon, Eric Rescorla, Ian Swett, and many others.dating place in dhaka bangladesh


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  • Use TLS alerts to signal TLS errors (#272, #374)
  • Require ClientHello to fit in a single packet (#338)
  • The second client handshake flight is now sent in the clear (#262, #337)
  • The QUIC header is included as AEAD Associated Data (#226, #243, #302)
  • Add interface necessary for client address validation (#275)
  • Define peer authentication (#140)
  • Require at least TLS 1.3 (#138)
  • Define transport parameters as a TLS extension (#122)
  • Define handling for protected packets before the handshake completes (#39)
  • Decouple QUIC version and ALPN (#12)

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  • Changed bit used to signal key phase.
  • Updated key phase markings during the handshake.
  • Added TLS interface requirements section.
  • Moved to use of TLS exporters for key derivation.
  • Moved TLS error code definitions into this document.

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  • Adopted as base for draft-ietf-quic-tls.
  • Updated authors/editors list.
  • Added status note.

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online dating in manchester uk Martin Thomson (editor)
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